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Labour markets and paid work are widely recognised
as central transmission mechanisms through which
the working poor contribute to, and benefit from,
economic growth. However, despite the significance
attached to paid work as the primary means through
which the poor can secure and advance their own
interests, employment generation as a policy variable
has not featured significantly in the macroeconomic
agenda. It has been assumed that opening up
economies to global competition and the promotion
of flexible labour markets would generate the
labour-intensive growth trajectories necessary for
poverty reduction. It has also been assumed that the
jobs generated will offer basic security of livelihoods
as well as enable workers to insure themselves and
their dependants against a variety of threats to their
livelihoods. Public measures for social protection
could then be restricted to those unable, for reasons
beyond their control, to earn their own living,
thereby restricting potential distortions to the labour
market.
These predictions have not been borne out in
practice. As Terry McKinley (this IDS Bulletin) and
others have pointed out, growth rates in developing
countries have generally been lower in the era of
neoliberalised economies than they were in the
earlier era of post-colonial policymaking (between
1950s to the mid-1970s). Poverty rates have declined
in many countries but globalisation has brought new
forms of insecurity. The pursuit of labour market
flexibility has led to rising levels of labour force
participation across the world but the increasingly
informal nature of these jobs means that they are
generally precarious and often badly paid, trapping
large sections of the working poor in chronic forms
of poverty. Current thinking about social protection
continues to be dominated by concerns about
possible distortions of the labour market and has
done little to stem the apparently inexorable spread
of informality of employment relationships. Despite
the policy commitment to poverty reduction through
the promotion of labour-intensive growth, the gains
for the poor have been ambiguous.
There is clearly a need to explore in greater detail
the processes of informalisation as they play out in
different contexts, to consider what forms of policy
support might help to protect and promote the
livelihoods of informal workers and to ask about the
extent to which such policy support can be
accommodated within current macroeconomic
thinking. This was the aim of a workshop that was
jointly convened in October 2007, by the
Vulnerability and Poverty Reduction Team at IDS and
members of the global research policy network
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and
Organizing (WIEGO). The workshop brought
together researchers, practitioners and policymakers
with overlapping interests in pro-poor
macroeconomic policy, in informal labour markets
and in social protection for the working poor. Their
contributions make up the three clusters of themes
covered in this IDS Bulletin.
1 Informality and labour markets
The opening article by James Heintz sets out the
nature of the challenge. Mainstream macroeconomic
analysis, and the policies which flow from it, is
crucially influenced by its understanding of economic
1
Economic Growth, Social Protection
and ‘Real’ Labour Markets: Linking
Theory and Policy
Sarah Cook, James Heintz and Naila Kabeer
IDS Bulletin Volume 39  Number 2  May 2008  © Institute of Development Studies
behaviour of micro-level actors, including those
active in the labour market. Thus the effectiveness of
macroeconomic policies in achieving poverty
reduction through employment generation will
depend crucially on the ‘fit’ between its
conceptualisation of labour markets and their reality
in different contexts. Where the fit is weak, policies
are likely to be ineffective.
Mainstream economics is premised on the ideal of
perfectly competitive labour markets, markets in
which employers and employees are given complete
freedom as to how they will utilise the resources at
their disposal and can enter into voluntary
employment relationships in a competitive
environment. It believes that such markets are most
likely to lead to the efficient allocation of labour and
other resources, promote growth and generate the
employment necessary to reduce poverty. The
macroeconomic policy which stems from this view of
labour markets is thus devoted to removing state
regulations or forms of social protection which
might distort the operation of free market forces.
‘Real’ labour markets depart in countless ways from
the text book analysis. For instance, transaction costs,
barely acknowledged in many labour market models,
create frictions which constrain the capacity of
owners of capital and providers of labour to
seamlessly re-allocate their efforts and resources in
response to market signals. Asymmetries of
information create asymmetries of power in
economic transactions. Employers and employees are
not equally indifferent to the termination of an
employment relationship since the alternatives they
face may be very different. It is generally employees
in the most exploitative relationships who find it
hardest to withdraw from the relationship because
they have the fewest alternatives and weakest fall-
back positions. It is generally those whose labour
efforts are least productive who are also least able to
earn a surplus beyond their basic needs which can be
invested in enhancing the productivity of their labour.
And more fundamentally, the failure of labour
markets to treat labour as a produced rather than an
exogenously given factor of production places the
reproduction of labour and investments in its quality
outside the framework of a great deal of
macroeconomic policy.
A number of the articles that follow pick up on the
theme of conceptualising the ‘real’ world of labour
markets and the growing phenomenon of informal
work. As Martha Chen points out, a number of
different explanations have been put forward to
explain the existence of the informal economy. These
entail alternative views of labour markets and how
they function. Early dualist approaches emphasised
two distinct and parallel labour markets or
economies, rooted in the nature of labour market
institutions, with the informal sector providing
income for the poor and a safety net in times of
crisis. Structuralist approaches emphasised the use of
informality as a means by which large capitalist firms
sought to lower their costs and increase their
competitiveness. Legalist explanations subscribed to
the notion that it was the costs, time and effort of
formal registration that kept many entrepreneurs
operating on an informal basis. And finally,
‘voluntarist’ explanations of informal work, most
closely associated with the competitive labour
market model, sees it as the outcome of a cost-
benefit calculus on the part of workers and hence a
matter of choice.
The reality, as Chen suggests, is that each of these
explanations has a degree of validity because it is
likely to apply to some segment of the labour
market. While each provides only a partial
explanation of real labour markets, together they
draw out attention to the heterogeneity of informal
forms of employment and the need to integrate the
relationships between the different segments of the
labour market, both formal and informal, into a
more unified framework of analysis.
A number of the other contributors also pick up on
the heterogeneity of the informal economy and
challenge monolithic explanations. For instance,
Johannes Jütting and his co-authors focus their
critique on the dualist concepts of the economy and
the treatment of the informal sector as a last resort
for workers who fail to find jobs in the formal sector.
They cite evidence showing considerable overlap in
labour force participation in formal and informal
work, with many workers combining formal and
informal activities as part of their livelihood strategies.
They find that fluctuations in the significance of these
different kinds of work do not follow patterns
predicted by the dualist school. While informal activity
does indeed often increase in times of recession,
suggesting its importance as a safety net of sorts,
many countries report a rise in informal activity in
times of boom. As labour markets tighten, workers
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become more willing to take the risk of starting their
own business, often informally. In such situations, the
move to the informal economy may be accompanied
by a rise in earnings. Moreover, there are other
aspects of informal work which workers may value,
including autonomy, flexible working hours and good
prospects. Recent data from Brazil found that around
30–40 per cent of women and men in the informal
salaried work would not quit for formal employment.
There is therefore far more ‘choice’ in the existence
of informal work than allowed for by either dualist or
structuralist schools.
Jütting et al. back up their challenge to monolithic
explanations of informality by examining the
phenomenon in the very different contexts of
Mexico and China. In Mexico, they point out that
informality has been a long-term feature of the
economic landscape. It reflects low rates of
economic growth, the costs associated with
excessive regulation (including red tape and labour
codes), low quality of services and high costs of social
security contributions associated with formal work.
In addition, it has been argued by some authors that
the existence of social assistance programmes for the
poor reduce incentives for formal employment. Thus
many workers choose to work informally although
they could move into formal work. In China, on the
other hand, they present the view that informal
employment has been an engine of growth and
reflects the dynamics of migration out of rural areas.
Rural migrants become informal wage workers
when they leave the place where they are registered.
While they suggest that the informal economy is a
dynamic sector of the economy, it also offers lower
wages, social security and far worse working
conditions than formal employment.
Two subsequent articles pick up the cases of Mexico
and China in greater detail, each departing to some
extent from the analysis presented by Jütting et al.
While Jütting et al. cite work by Maloney, among
others, to support the view that informal work in
Mexico is a utility maximising choice, Mercedes
González de la Rocha and Agustín Escobar Latapí
challenge Maloney’s characterisation of informal
employment in Mexico and, by extension, voluntarist
approaches to the labour market. Maloney’s view
that workers opt for informality because of their
reluctance to pay for the high costs of formal social
protection makes the implicit assumption that
informal forms of insurance are available, effective
and relatively costless. Yet the evidence from Mexico
suggests that considerable time, money and effort
has to be invested in social networks if they are to
provide the necessary social protection. The ageing
of the population is further straining these networks.
Nor were all workers in the informal economy out
of choice. For many, formal work was not an option.
For others, the risks associated with starting their
own ventures only became a feasible option when
they had accumulated sufficient knowledge, contacts
and assets in formal employment or when they had
offspring old enough to share breadwinning
responsibilities for the household. In the case of
women workers with young children, it is difficult to
know the extent to which informal self-employment
could be described in voluntarist terms since it was
unlikely that many could have chosen otherwise.
However, the most important element of the
critique by González de la Rocha and Escobar Latapí
is the ahistorical nature of Maloney’s analysis – the
use of findings from the mid-1960s to support his
analysis of Mexican labour markets at the start of the
twenty-first century. The impact of changes in
macroeconomic policy regimes means that women
and men are now making decisions about the labour
market in the context of a liberalised economy
compared to those which had prevailed in the earlier
era of import-substituting industrialisation. There was
then indeed much greater mobility between formal
and informal jobs, as Maloney describes, and
households were characterised by occupational
heterogeneity. The general economic downturn
associated with the Mexican debt crisis in the early
1980s and subsequent restructuring and liberalisation
of the economy has seen a growth in precarious
forms of work and a decline in occupational mobility,
suggesting a rise in social stratification. There are
now far more risks to leaving formal jobs for
informal than there used to be, and the voluntarism
described by Maloney may be even less valid as an
explanation for informal employment than it was in
an earlier era.
Changes in the broader policy environment also form
the backdrop to Sarah Cook’s analysis of the growth
in informal employment in China. As she points out,
the conditions under which labour is supplied,
exchanged and rewarded in the labour markets that
have emerged in the transition from a closed and
planned economy to a more market-oriented and
open one have changed beyond recognition. There
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has been a huge rise in what would be
conventionally classified as ‘informal employment’ in
China (i.e. part-time, often low paid and generally
unprotected), although officials and policymakers use
the terminology of ‘flexible’ employment to avoid
the negative connotations of informality. As Cook
points out, it is possible to analyse the rise of
informal work in China through different labour
market frameworks. One focuses on the structural,
economic and demographic transformations
associated with these changes and the obstacles
posed in particular by the household registration
system to the emergence of more unified labour
markets. The second examines the transition from a
state-controlled system of labour allocations and
rewards towards a more competitive, neoclassical
labour market.
However, neither approach pays a great deal of
attention to the institutional underpinnings of rising
informality: the blossoming of older forms of
entrepreneurship which existed on the margins of
the planned economy; the diversification of activities
which came with the loosening of economic
controls, the migration out of the countryside in
search of the employment opportunities generated
by export-oriented growth; the shock reform
measures which pushed large numbers of previously
‘formal’ workers into low-income jobs previously
done by migrants; and the attempts by enterprises to
avoid cumbersome but poorly enforced labour
regulations. Nor does either approach examine the
distributional impacts of these various strands of
change and what they imply for the ‘losers’ who lack
the qualifications and credentials to compete in
these emerging labour markets or those who are
located in the most vulnerable and often least visible
jobs in the informal economy. What is needed, Cook
suggests, is an institutional approach that identifies
the concrete realities of the labour market and
focuses on the different logics behind processes of
informality. This would provide a more grounded
basis on which to consider the question of
government regulation of the economy, when it
should intervene and for what reason.
The final article in this section further adds to the
general picture emerging from the previous
contributions. Imraan Valodia points out that while
South Africa appears to have lower levels of informal
employment than most developing countries, the
evidence shows that large numbers of formal
workers have extremely low wages and their
conditions of work are not significantly different
from workers in informal work. Valodia presents
findings from a pilot survey of informal traders in
urban South Africa that their price setting behaviour
was strongly influenced by their views about the
competition they faced. For many, these included the
prices set by traders in the formal economy as well
as those in the informal. It would appear that in
South Africa, formal and informal trading did not
constitute separate and independent spheres.
A second set of findings come from panel data
compiled from multi-year labour force surveys.
Valodia points to significant ‘churning’ at the less
well paid end of the labour market – including
movements between formal and informal
employment. The frequency of these movements
not only challenges dualist models of the labour
market but also raises questions about the
voluntarism behind informal employment since this
mobility is not generally associated with
improvements in the quality of employment.
2 Informality and social protection
While the first cluster of articles in this IDS Bulletin
deals with informality in the context of labour
markets and draws out some implications for social
protection, this second cluster addresses more
explicitly the challenges for social protection
strategies presented by the growth of informal
labour. Gerry Rodgers is concerned with the failure
of the highly aggregated indicators used in
macroeconomic analysis to capture the diversity of
work and employment relations and hence to
provide an accurate picture of the employment
consequences of growth. As he points out, policies
for labour-intensive growth strategies as the route to
poverty reduction give a privileged place to the
employment elasticity of growth but make no
distinction between the generation of ‘good jobs’,
‘poor jobs’ and the various forms of unemployment
(‘no jobs’) through which the poor in poor countries
have sought to secure their daily survival. Rough-and-
ready estimates suggest that the majority of jobs in
lower- and many middle-income countries fall into
the categories of ‘poor jobs’ or ‘no jobs’. Given that
implausibly high rates of growth would be required
to substantially increase the percentage of good jobs
in the economy, he suggests that the more
immediate concern should be to improve the quality
of poor jobs. One argument for such improvement
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lies in evidence that better quality jobs are likely to
be more productive. Where the costs of
improvement are lower than the gains to
productivity, market-led improvements in the quality
of jobs may occur over time, as it has in South Korea
and Chile since the early 1990s.
More often, however, the pressure on wage costs
exerted by global competition has seen a
deterioration in the quality of jobs. In such contexts,
moves to improve job quality raise costs more than
productivity and large sections of the labour force are
likely to be caught in a low-quality, low-productivity
trap. What may be necessary in such contexts is a
‘package approach’ to employment policy, involving a
‘non-marginal shift in social and economic policies
and institutions built around quality jobs’. The
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) ‘Decent Work’
agenda represents such an approach. It identifies six
key issues that should be factored into pro-poor growth
policies along with concerns with the generation of
jobs: rights at work, security in work, conditions of
work and remuneration of work, all of which relate
directly to the quality of jobs along with voice,
organisation and patterns of equality and inclusion
relating to the functioning of the labour market.
Given different levels of development and different
social values, the decent work framework should be
regarded as a way to incorporate concerns with the
quality of work into the policy agenda rather than a
universal set of prescriptions. The caution about
universal prescriptions is reinforced by the possibility
that there may be trade-offs as well as
complementarities between different dimensions of
the agenda. Improvements in wages and working
conditions could lead to improvements in labour
productivity or they could be secured at the cost of
employment creation. Nevertheless, a focus on
decent work as a dimension of development helps to
ensure that development trajectories encompass
social as well as economic goals.
Victor Tokman’s contribution provides a nuanced
discussion of labour market regulations, particularly
in relation to labour contracts, as a barrier to
flexibility. As he points out, within the earlier closed
economic systems of Latin America, it was possible
to use labour contracts to compensate for the
absence of unemployment compensation. The result
of this was that the costs of firing workers on
permanent contracts in Latin America was almost
twice the costs prevailing in the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
while labour regulations were 26 per cent higher
than the OECD and 54 per cent higher than those
prevailing in East Asia. However, with the opening
up of economies, the high costs associated with
labour regulations created constraints on the
capacity of economies to adjust to the new
competitive environment.
The resulting labour reforms adopted a policy of
‘flexibility at the margins’ because existing labour rights
were left intact. Reforms were aimed at reducing the
costs of dismissing workers and permitting ‘atypical’ or
limited duration contracts for the newly hired. While
this reduced the costs of labour from the point of
view of employers, it imposed other kinds of social
and economic costs. It led to higher turnover rates, to
increased levels of anxiety among workers and a
growth in the percentages of workers with little or no
social protection. High levels of turnover and
uncertainty about job prospects in turn reduced
incentives on the part of firms to innovate and invest
in training their workers and on the part of workers to
upgrade their own skills.
The market and citizenship failures associated with
informalisation suggest the need to rethink the
question of regulation. Tokman suggests priority
should be given to creating greater flexibility to
permanent contracts rather than seeking to
encourage the proliferation of atypical contracts and
hence labour informality. However, if workers in
informal enterprises are to be provided social and legal
protection, there have to be provisions to promote the
economic performance of these enterprises and thus
their ability to comply with labour regulations. Tokman
therefore suggests a two-pronged strategy to the
question of regulation. The first prong is for the
benefit of entrepreneurs: it would simplify the
bureaucratic procedures involved in registering or
closing down enterprises and in gaining legal
recognition of the de facto ownership of assets by
these enterprises so that they have a collateral base.
The second prong would seek to promote labour
rights in the informal economy through the formal
recognition of the employment relationship and the
extension of labour rights and social protection.
While it may not be possible to enforce the same set
of labour rights for all workers in the informal
economy, given the differential capacity of employers
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to comply, it should be possible to enforce some
minimum threshold on labour issues, based on core
labour rights. Thus, Tokman suggests that while
differential interest rates, tax regimes or collective
systems may be necessary to promote the
formalisation and prosperity of smaller enterprises,
there has to be uniformity on this minimum
threshold because these core labour rights represent
human rights transferred to the sphere of work.
Similarly, given the difficulties of defining
employer–employee relationships in the expanding
informal economy, Tokman suggests that the right to
social protection should be extended to people as
citizens rather than as workers and awarded on the
basis of universal principles. The increasing provision
of income support to the elderly through social
pensions which are not tied to labour contracts are
examples of this. Tokman concludes that, given
supportive fiscal policy, ‘de-linking protection from
labour participation would create opportunities to
increase employment and improve business, while
guaranteeing security’.
Carmelo Mesa-Lago points to the association
between levels of informality in the labour force in
different Latin American countries and the coverage
of their populations by health and pension schemes.
Income, gender, education, ethnicity and location are
part of the explanation for the distribution of
coverage. However, beyond individuals and group
characteristics, the structure of the economy and the
institutional nature of provision play an important
role. The association between high levels of
informality and low levels of coverage is clearly not
accidental. Countries with high levels of informality
in their workforce tend to report lower reliance on
state provision. Indeed, state regulation plays an
important role in explaining variations in coverage.
Countries with mandatory pension systems have
considerably higher coverage than those with
voluntary affiliation. However, the legal mandate for
affiliation is most likely to improve coverage when
the state provides subsidies to low income, often
self-employed, informal workers. Countries with
high levels of informality in their workforce tended
to report segmented and regressive distribution of
health funds, allocating more to the private sector
and social insurance and less to public forms of
provision which were responsible for the majority of
the population.
Since the idea that economic growth will lead to the
expansion in formal employment and in the share of
the population covered by social protection has not
been borne out by empirical evidence, Mesa-Lago
concludes that social protection systems will need to
be adapted to the growing informality of labour
markets and to extending coverage to hitherto
excluded groups. Experience from the Latin American
contexts yields a number of lessons for the design of
such systems: the need for fiscal subsidies to provide
incentives to excluded and vulnerable groups to
affiliate to existing schemes, special regimes for rural
workers and peasants; greater coordination between
public and social insurance sectors to prevent
duplication of coverage and cost-efficiency,
contributions that are proportional or progressive in
relation to income, provision of optional insurance to
housewives; bonuses to women who exit the labour
force to raise their children and priority to indigenous
groups, using geographical targeting to overcome
their greater isolation.
Francie Lund points out that the World Bank’s Risk
Management Framework can be seen as an element
of its pro-poor growth strategy, a recognition that
fluctuations in income flows is one of the critical
dimensions of poverty. However, it is rooted in the
same neoclassical economic tradition as competitive
labour market theory and makes the same
assumptions about the capacity of individuals to
make choices – in this case between different risk
mitigation strategies. In view of its support for the
promotion of flexible labour markets, there is a
strong argument emerging from the World Bank
that core social protection measures such as
pensions and health insurance, should be de-linked
from the labour contract, thereby reducing potential
distortions in the demand for labour.
Value chain analysis, on the other hand, has served to
draw attention to the way in which informal and
formal conditions of work interact across different
stages of the same production and to make visible
the connections between some of the most
vulnerable workers in the labour market and some of
the most powerful corporations in the global
economy. Lund argues against the idea of de-linking
social protection from the labour contract precisely
because it removes employer responsibility for those
who contribute to their profits. However, she is
concerned that the ILO’s concern with extending its
‘Decent work for all’ agenda to those who fall
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outside the existing system of social security can lead
it to overlook ongoing processes of informalisation
and the continued loss of access to existing measures
of social protection by workers on a daily basis.
Lund therefore focuses her attention on the kinds of
interventions that are most likely to protect and
promote livelihoods in labour market environments
in which the majority of workers are, and are likely
to continue in, informal employment. She is
concerned to move beyond small project-based
interventions to a scale of response that is adequate
to meet the scale of the challenge. One promising
approach would be to develop measures at the
intersections between the formal and informal
within the economy. For instance, formal insurance
companies could be encouraged by incentives or
guarantees from the government to develop and
extend products to the working poor and micro-
entrepreneurs. If insurance and savings schemes for
poorer workers could be institutionally housed
within larger insurance institutions, they would
benefit from cross-subsidies in the use of
institutional infrastructure, communication systems
and expertise. She suggests that there is a need to
decentralise some of the responsibility for the design
and management of social protection strategies to
local government who are more attuned to the
spatial dimensions of informality.
3 Macroeconomic policy and employment
generation
Macroeconomic policies shape the environment in
which labour markets function and define the
resource envelope available to realise basic social
protections, including the right to productive
employment with decent earnings. The articles in
this cluster critically evaluate the prevailing
macroeconomic orthodoxy, the assumptions about
the ways economies work and suggest alternative
ideas for policies that would facilitate the creation of
decent employment and thereby raise living
standards, promote equitable growth, and reduce
poverty.
In his article, Terry McKinley argues that the
dominant approach to macroeconomic management
under the direction of the Bretton-Woods
Institutions – which he collectively terms neoliberal
economic policies – have failed to deliver faster and
more equitable growth – prerequisites for
sustainable poverty reduction. The earlier discourse
of ‘structural adjustment’ has been replaced by
‘poverty reduction strategies’ and ‘pro-poor growth’.
However, McKinley argues that the macroeconomic
content of the poverty reduction strategy papers
(PRSPs) has remained the same, despite the shift in
emphasis to poverty reduction as a stated goal. The
approach adopted by the PRSPs represents a
monoculture of ideas, in which a common set of
prescriptions are applied to all poor countries.
McKinley critically examines these types of national
poverty reduction strategies in terms of their shallow
veneer of ‘participation’ and ‘national ownership,’
their bias against the public sector, their obsession
with very low rates of inflation, their inability to
accord public investment its proper role in
development, the failed experiment of financial
deregulation, and the drive towards privatisation.
McKinley concludes with an alternative framework,
which stresses the need to coordinate economic
policies to support better growth and employment
outcomes which, in turn, will reduce the incidence
of poverty. Macroeconomic strategies are a necessary
part of this policy mix, but, by themselves they are
not sufficient to realise these objectives. McKinley
therefore advocates for a tripartite approach; one
that combines macroeconomic, structural (targeted
policies which impact the structure of production
and economic institutions), and equity-enhancing
policies, aimed specifically at improving the welfare
of the poor.
Ricardo Gottschalk picks up on the themes raised by
McKinley and provides additional detail to the
discussion of policy alternatives. Gottschalk argues
that macroeconomic policies must be sufficiently
flexible to adapt to the specific features and
institutional settings of different countries.
Maintaining macroeconomic stability remains
important and flexible policies are more suited to
this objective, since they can respond quickly to
external shocks. In addition, the costs and trade-offs
associated with the specific, rules-based targets
currently in vogue – for example, maintaining a very
low inflation target – must be taken into account.
Gottschalk points out that economic stability has
improved in many countries worldwide, which raises
the critical question, ‘What now?’ In answer to this
question, he suggests that there is need for
macroeconomic policies to target real economic
outcomes, such as growth, instead of nominal prices,
as is the case with inflation-targeting.
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Gottschalk discusses the components of an
alternative macroeconomics, including monetary,
fiscal, and exchange rate policies that would allow
policymakers to target real performance indicators,
such as the growth rate. Growth targeting requires
the mobilisation of both public and private resources.
However, there are real limits on expansionary
policies, which need to be taken into account.
Monetary policy must be prepared to address the
destabilising impact of capital flows and excess
liquidity, fiscal policy must be sustainable and not rely
excessively on debt financing, and exchange rate
policy must be prepared to steer a tight course,
guarding against excessive appreciation or
deprecation. Gottschalk also discusses the role of
financial policies – one of McKinley’s structural policy
areas – arguing that the failed experiment of
financial liberalisation represents a lost opportunity
to implement meaningful reforms that would
support broad-based growth.
John Toye raises a different set of concerns. Like
Gottschalk and McKinley, he argues that
macroeconomic policies are sensitive to the
institutional context in which they are implemented
and, therefore, macroeconomic alternatives must be
developed taking into account these real constraints.
Alternative ‘Keynesian’ policies were developed in
the context of European and North American
industrialised economies in the first half of the
twentieth century. Therefore, their applicability to
other countries and other points in history cannot
simply be taken for granted. Toye puts forward two
‘stylised’ types of economies with very different
labour market characteristics: developed economies
and developing economies. He points out that
developing economies often face stringent supply-
side constraints, particularly in the agricultural sector,
that limit the effectiveness of traditional Keynesian
(i.e. demand-focused) interventions. Macroeconomic
policies which do not address these supply-side
barriers may produce unintended outcomes.
Toye, along with McKinley and Gottschalk, stresses
the importance of public spending, including public
investment to relax supply-side constraints. However,
Toye departs from the other two authors on the
issue of price stability. He argues that the efficient
management of public spending requires a stable
macroeconomic environment – particularly price
stability. Therefore, the benefits of maintaining tight
control over inflation are substantial with regard to
improving the efficiency of the fiscus as a
development tool. All three contributors share the
view that macro policies need to be coordinated
with other targeted interventions. However, Toye
stresses the benefits of a low-inflation environment,
while McKinley and Gottschalk suggest that lowering
inflation generates real economic costs that, at some
point, outweigh the benefits.
Radhika Lal’s article rounds out this section with a
discussion of economic policies in the specific
context of informal employment. Lal questions the
argument that the rise of informality is simply a
manifestation of the need for deregulation and
flexible (i.e. market-determined) outcomes – a
perspective frequently adopted by neoclassical
economists. She points out that neglecting the
impact informalisation has on the demand-side of
the economy can lead to faulty conclusions. Workers
are consumers as well as dependent producers – and
Lal argues that the structure of employment shapes
the structure of the domestic market. For example, a
polarised labour market means that the domestic
market will be characterised by substantial
inequalities, limiting domestic sources of aggregate
demand and profoundly influencing the growth path
in ways that may be inconsistent with a country’s
development objectives. In contrast, when the
majority of employment opportunities meet
minimum standards of decency, the domestic market
will maintain a strong ‘middle’ that contributes
positively to economic and employment growth.
Like Toye and Gottschalk, Lal emphasises that
structural differences among countries will influence
macroeconomic outcomes and, therefore, the
correct policy mix. Like McKinley, she argues against
a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and the need for more
interventionist alternatives. Lal extends her discussion
beyond macroeconomic policies and advocates for
targeted, productive sector policies within the
context of informal employment. Such policies,
successful in the past, have been abandoned in favour
of liberalisation, under the assumption that markets
will correctly allocate resources to achieve dynamic,
long-run efficiency. Lal argues that this market-based
approach will not, in itself, support long-run
sustainable development. Lal more fully develops an
analysis of the use of targeted productive sector
policies (called industrial policies) to guide the
allocation of resources in support of employment
creation and poverty reduction. In this respect, her
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article takes on McKinley’s call for complementary
structural policies. However, Lal adds additional
details that focus on the need to coordinate macro-
policies with more localised economic development.
4 Conclusion
Together, the articles in this IDS Bulletin help to
sketch out the changing nature of the global
economy and provide important empirical insights
into the functioning of labour markets as flexible
labour market policies take root in different regions
of the world. At the same time, they point to some
of the unresolved debates about how labour markets
should be conceptualised and what this implies for
macroeconomic policies and the scope for social
protection. They suggest that the heterogeneity of
these markets, together with evidence of
movements between formal and informal work,
challenge dualistic representations along a
formal–informal divide. However, there are some
very real barriers to mobility among sections of the
labour force which prevent the emergence of unified
and competitive labour markets of the kind assumed
by neoclassical economics.
Neoclassical models have been important in stressing
the importance of agency and choice in explaining
some of the distribution between formal and
informal activities. However, they are less able to
explain the structural asymmetries of power
between different actors in the labour market and
the low-wage, low-productivity trap in which many
workers find themselves. The asymmetries of power
between the large-scale owners of capital and those
who must rely on the sale of their labour to secure
their survival are the most obvious of these but there
are other asymmetries based on gender, ethnicity,
race and so on which render certain groups within
the labour market less mobile, and hence more
vulnerable than others. These asymmetries have been
exacerbated by the form taken by current processes
of globalisation which have removed restrictions on
the mobility of capital but left restrictions on labour
relatively intact. The growing informality of labour
markets, and the rise in precarious forms of work,
suggests the need for more structural analysis of
labour markets which taken account of these
asymmetries of power in the context of increasing
globalisation.
This leads to the question addressed by several
authors in this IDS Bulletin: what can be done to
protect labour in the context of globalisation? It is
clear that excessive regulation does act as a
deterrent to many employers and that there is a case
for simplifying procedures and legal recognition but
it is equally clear that all workers in the economy
should enjoy some minimum level of protection,
regardless of their location in the economy and the
status of their employment. The debate revolves
around what form this protection should take. The
absence of a clear consensus on this reflects
differences in views about how markets work and
the absence of conclusive evidence about the
relationship between different dimensions of social
protection and levels of employment.
The likelihood of a trade-off favours the position
taken by Tokman, who argues in favour of de-linking
social protection from work status. Universalising
access to some minimum level of social protection,
such as health and pensions, on the basis of people’s
rights as citizens rather than workers would improve
businesses and increase employment while
guaranteeing security. Lund, on the other hand, is
concerned that de-linking social protection from
employment status absolves employers of
responsibility towards those who contribute to their
profits. It also rules out an important source of
financial contributions to the social protection of
informal workers.
The affordability of social protection is a theme that
underpins many of the articles in this volume. One of
the problems associated with informality is that it
allows those who could afford to contribute to the
collective social welfare to avoid doing so (or at least
discourages them from doing so), while it makes
those who most need collective social support the
most difficult to reach. The articles on
macroeconomic policies generally agree that
macroeconomic policy instruments, with the
exception of fiscal policies, can only have an indirect
effect on these excluded groups through the volume
of employment they are able to generate. Fiscal
policies may have a more direct effect, both through
the kinds of expenditures they support as well as
through the mobilisation of tax revenues to support
such expenditure. Explicit structural and equity-
enhancing policies, which would encompass the
social protection measures described elsewhere in
the IDS Bulletin, may be necessary to complement
macroeconomic policies to promote their pro-poor
bias. What constitutes a point of contention,
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however, both among these articles and in the wider
literature, is the level of deficit financing, and
associated inflationary pressures that will undermine
the goal of pro-poor growth. As Gottschalk points
out, the range of inflation levels considered
compatible with growth varies from 7–11 per cent to
around 30–40 per cent.
Such widely varying estimates signal the absence of
consensus on some of the key parameters of growth
policy. They may also signal the widely varying
conditions under which macroeconomic policies are
attempting to pursue growth, including, of course,
the very different labour market conditions. This
takes us back to the ‘call for action’ with which
Heintz ends his article. He points out that how we
conceptualise labour markets will have a profound
influence on our understanding of macroeconomics,
growth and social policy. One of the key implications
which comes out of the articles in this IDS Bulletin is
that we need a better understanding of the way that
labour markets function in the real world – and in
different parts of the real world – if we are to find
macroeconomic policies that will better deliver on
the outcomes they promise.
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